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I.

Introduction
This paper considers briefly the welfare theory of directly-unproduc-

tive profit-seeking activities, focusing on the asymmetry of outcomes depending

on whether the distortion that triggers off such activities is a price or a
quantity distortion.

Section 11 considers the nature of such activities

and the reasons for treating them as separate from traditional profit-seeking
activities, contrasting and evaluating the approaches taken to this broad subject
by differrent recent writers.

Having so clarified the essential nature of

such activities, the paper proceeds in Section Ill to illustrating the asymmetry
of outcomes for the specific case of tariffs versus trade quotas, raised in
the literature by Krueger (1974) and discussed further by Bhagwati and
Srinivasan (1980).

Section IV then extends the analysis to derive two

Propositions of a more general nature.

Section V offers some concluding

remarks on the asyDD11etrical effects of directly-unproductive profit-seeking
activities induced by price and quantity distortions.

II.

Directly-unproductive Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities:

The Concept

In the last decade, a number of economists have turned to analyzing
esoteric activities such as illegal transactions (e.g. smuggling or tariff
evasion) lobbying for licenses, lobbying for tariffs or monopoly etc., none
of which were part of the economists' standard tool kit.
Bhagwati (1980b)has recently argued that the key characteristic of
these activities is that they represent, unlike the "normal" or "traditional"
activities of economic models, ways of making profits that do not involve
directly the production of any output.

In short, they are directly-unproductive,

profit-seeking (hereafter DUP) activities. 1
into two distinct categories:

Moreover, these activities fall

those that are triggered by existing distortions
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(as when a distortiona ry quota leads to a premium-see king lobby in Krueger (1974))
and hence, since the equilibrium in the absence of DUP activities is itself one
characteriz ed by distortions , create an inherently second-best problem; and
those that may analytically be related to a first-best situation (as when
lobbying for a tariff is implicitly or explicitly relative to an optimal free
trade equilibrium for a small, undistorted economy in the absence of DUP
activities) .
The earlier attempt by Krueger (1974) to develop the concept of "rent
seeking" .addressed a narrower class of DUP activities:

one where the lobbying

activities were triggered by licensing.o f one kind or another.

Thus he.r il

lustrations of "rent-seekin g" activities were almst wholly related to licensing
mechanisms and her formal analysis explicitly considered an import quota which,
in fact, was contrasted with an otherwise-e quivalent tariff on the
assumption that the latter, being a price distortion and hence not involving
rents to licenses, would not generate any "rent-seekin g" activity.

Thus

Krueger's 'tent-seekin g" concept and theory omitted reference to DUP activities
unrelated to licensing mechanisms.
At the same time, her concept did not bring out the distinguish ing essence
of the license-gen erated DUP activities.

For, the interesting and critical

analytical essence of her license-rel ated profit-seek ing activities is not
the fact that these activities are aimed at profits which represent economic
rents but rather that, as Bhagwati (1980b) has argued, they involve zero-output ,
directly-un productive profit-seek ing.

In fact, if one really takes the

- presence of rents in the economic s~nse as the critical test for defining a
relevant category of profit-seek ing activities as against others, then a
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slight reflection will show that such rent-seeking activities will fail to
exclude wholly our traditional, productive activities as well.

Thus,

consider the standard models with primary factors producing goods entering
the social utility function with given factor endowments in full employment.
In these

familiar classroom models, remuneration of producing agents is wholly

pure rents (and hence involves "rent-seeking") because the minimum supply price
of factors is zero and any return over the minimum supply price is evidently
economic rent ..
Thus, Krueger (1974) in coming to the problem from the standpoint of
licensing-generated profit-seeking activities which were thus characterized
by both DUP and rents (on the licenses), thus failed to note the (generic)
DUP feature and focussed instead on the incidental rent characteristic.

Thus

she did not see the far more general nature of DUP activities, of which
license-generated profit-seeking activities are only a fraction.

And her

phrase, "rent-seeking", is inappropriate though fetching and additionally has
the drawback just noted, i.e. that it also can embrace traditionally analyzed
productive profi.t-seeking activities from which one wants to differentiate
the (DUP) activities at hand.
By contrast, Buchanan (1980) has adopted the phrase "rent-seeking"
to go beyond the Krueger conception of license-generated profit-seeking
activities and happens to have defined it far more generally, much like
Bhagwati (1980b). While the phrase rent-seeking is inappropriate in that
event, as argued above, there is a far more basic problem with the Buchanan
definition which is radically different, as it happens, from Bhagwati's DUP
activity definition despite superficial similarity.
states:

Thus Buchanan (1980, p. 4)
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"The unintended results of individual efforts at maximizing
returns on opportunities may be "bad" rather than "good". The
term rent seeking is designed to describe behavior in institutional
settings where individual efforts to maximize value generate social
waste rather than social surplus."
It is evident therefore that whereas

Bhagwati defines DUP activities

as all those that involve zero output at their direct or primary impact,
Buchanan is defining his "rent-seeking" activities as those profit-seeking
activities that, unlike others, result in ultimate loss.
.Tullock (1980) et

Since Buchanan,

al. of the public-choice school evidently intend, if their

examples of what they describe as rent-seeking are any guide, to include DUP
activities in their ambit and their definition, it would appear that at least
they think that there should be no conflict between the two definitions:

as

indeed there would not be if primary-impact zero-output DUP activities resulted
in a social loss of resources, thus guaranteeing an ultimate "social waste". 2
But that is precisely what cannot be assumed.

As Bhagwati and

Srinivasan (1980) and Bhagwati (1980a) (1980b) have demonstrated, DUP activities
which are triggered by distortions and hence are characterized by a secondbest situation may well be characterized in turn by "social surplus" rather
than "social waste".

Thus, any DUP activities which result paradoxically in

welfare improvement would automatically have to be ruled out from the umbrella
extended by Buchanan and associates!

E.g. illegal trade that impoves welfare

--Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), Sheikh (1974) etc.-, revenue seeking or
premium-seeking that are beneficial in their outcome, and so on:
would drop out of Buchanan's. not Bhagwati's, reach.

all these

5

But surely that was not intended!

Quite simply, Buchanan's definition

appears to have been based on the erroneous assumption that real resources
expended in lobbying and such activities must obviously amount to social waste.
This is the fallacy of treating as necessarily a first-best problem what can
be a second-best problem.
Therefore, whereas Buchanan must be complimente d on attempting to go
beyond Krueger's concern with only license-rela ted profit-seek ing activities
and to get at a general formulation , he seems to have erred in adopting her
inappropria te "rent-seekin g" phraseology and, even more critically, in using
a definition that begs the question whether the kinds of activities he wished
to describe would lead to social waste.
In this paper, therefore, we reject both the Krueger and Buchanan
conceptuali zations, definitions and phraseology and adopt that of Bhagwati,
addressing the subsequent analysis in this paper therefore to DUP activities
and their welfare consequence s, especially in regard to the asymmetry of out
comes when DUP activities are triggered by price rather than quantity dis
tortions.

Ill.

Second-best DUP Activities:
or Trade Subsidies
It has been noted above

The Case of Trade Quotas versus Tariffs

that, as already well known from earlier work

of ours, DUP activities that are triggered by existing distortions must be
analyzed as constitutin g a second-best problem.

And we also know, from Bhagwati

and Srinivasan (1980),- that in view of the second-best nature of the problem,
DUP activities may be paradoxical ly beneficial.

Or, in other words, since we
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are dealin g with zero-o utput activi ties that utiliz e real resour
ces, the
shadow factor price of a factor may be suffic iently negati ve
in the initia lly
distor ted equili brium to make the zero-o utput DUP activi ty welfar
e-imp roving .
This point was made in Bhagw ati and Sriniv asan (1980) with refere
nce
to a revenu e-seek ing lobby.

Thus, imagin e a tariff- seekin g lobby has

succee ded and a protec tive tariff has been put in place.

Imagin e next that

the revenu e that result s from this (nonp rohibi tive) tariff attrac
ts a
revenu e-seek ing lobby.

This revenu e-seek ing lobby theref ore operat es from

an inital ly-dis torted , tariff- ridden equili brium .

Thus, turn to Figure 1.

There a small countr y with given terms of trade PtCt and a produ
ction pos
sibili ty curve AB
able good 2

is depict ed.

Then

a tariff is impose d, making the impor t

more expens ive domes tically and leadin g to produ ction at Pt at

the point of tangen cy of the tariff -inclu sive price- ratio PtS
with AB, and
consum ption at Ct.

Now, a DUP revenu e-seek ing activi ty which this tariff

genera tes would lead to produc tion of goods shifti ng from Pt
to somewhere
inside AB and, if this shift occurr ed to a poi.nt such as PD in
the stripe d zone,
ti1e revenu t>seek .iug activi ty woula parado xicall y improv
e welfar e:

as at

I.e. the shadow price of a factor at a tariff -disto rted equili
brium such as
Pt

could be (suffi cientl y) negati ve to genera te this outcom e.
Now, does this parado xical possi bility , inhere nt in the secon
~best

nature of the proble m at hand, not arise equall y if the tariff
at Pt is re
placed instea d by an import quota? It would seem at first blush
that it would.
And, Bhagw ati and Sriniv asan (1980) indeed argued that it would. 3
as Mehmud dul Anam of Carlet on Unive rsity notice d, this is not
so.

However,
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For, in the case of a QR on exports or imports, when
defined purely in quantity (rather than value} terms, the
trade triangle is fixed for the binding quota as CtOtPt
no matter where Pt

and,

shifts to within AB as a result of

premium-s eeking, the attendant constraine d-trad~ equilibriu m
must imply that the resulting consumptio n point cDq
rise above cts and hence above Ut

cannot

as well.

As long as imports are fixed quantitat ively, therefore ,
premium-s eeking has to be immiseriz ing.

(i) The result holds

equally for export and import quotas, when the country is
small.

(ii} Again, for a small country, the result will

hold if the quotas are defined in foreign values, rather than
in pure quantity.

(iii) However, even for a small country,

the critical constrain t on import

quantity may be relaxed,

opening up the possibili ty of beneficia l premium-s eeking
if an import quota is defined in domestic values:

for, as

the implicit tariff falls, the same domestic- value constrain t
can accommoda te an increasing quantity of imports.

(iv) For

a large country, however, the possibili ty of admitting the
paradox of beneficia l premium-s eeking is enhanced.

Thus,

while an import quota will close off this possibili ty, an
export quota does not (unless one imposes the restrictio n
that the foreign offer curve be elastic).

Thus, the same

export level may be compatibl e with more than one import
quantitit es and thus the critical import quantity constrain t
may not operate to exclude the paradox of beneficia l premium-
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seeking.

(v)

foreign values,

Again, even if the import quota is fixed in
the variable terms of trade implied by

the large country assumption can relax the import constraint
and open up the paradoxical possibility.
Finally, the above analysis of tariffs and trade quotas
indicates that the presence of quotas, rather than (ad

valorem) price distortions , may quite generally restrict
the scope of paradoxical welfare-impro vement from premium
seeking.

This general result on price versus quantity

distortions is precisely what is analyzed in the -nP,Xt Section.

IV.

Price versus Quantity Distortions and Negative Shadow
Prices for Factors
Evidently, the critical question to be investigated in

examining the paradoxical possibility of welfare-impro ving
DUP activity {which has zero output) is whether at

least one shadow factor price is negative: for, that is a
necessary condition for the nel
activity to be positive.
that:

welfare impact of such

It can then be shown quite readily

4

PROPOSITION !:Whenever the distortion that triggers seeking

activity is the only distortion in the economy, and is a (pure)
quantity constraint and remains a binding constraint in the
presence of the seeking activity, the shadow price of a
primary factor cannot be negative; and
PROPOSITION 2: When the only distortion is instead an ad valorem
price distortion, the shadow price of a primary factor may
be negative

(except when the distortion does not affect productive efficiency).
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The essential argument underlying proposition (1) is
that., while the DUP activity takes place in a second-best
distortionary situation, it fails to improve welfare because
the quantity constraint "bottles up" the source of positive
gain that might outweigh the loss implied
by diversion of real resources to the DUP activity.
This, on the other hand, does not happen when the distortion
is instead of a price varietv.
To see this in the traditional 2x2, small, open economy
5
model, consider then the four classic distortionary cases,
in their quantity and price versions:
and trade tariff;
tax-cum-subsidy;

(1) trade quota/constraint

(2) production quota/constraint and production
(3) factor use quota/constraint and factor

tax-cum-subsidy; and (4) consumption quota/constraint and
consumption tax-cum-subsidy.
In the algebraic analysis below, we will write the
transformation function as

x2

x1 =

F (X

2

,

K, L)

where

are the output levels of the two goods 1 and 2, and

factor endowments.
U = U (X

1

- E, x

2

x1

and

K, L

The social utility function is
+ E) where Eis the export of good 1 and

the world goods price-ratio is unity by choice of units.
The shadow price of L, w*, in terms of utility impact is
then derived for the different distortions.

are the
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A.Tr ade Quo ta and Trad e Tar iff:
tion III, usin g
We have alre ady con side red thes e in Sec
6
le.
ona
rati
ing
erly
und
the
ng
lopi
geo met rica l argu men ts and deve
forw ard.
The alge brai c trea tme nt is fair ly stra ight
wri te:
(i) Trad e Quo ta: In this case , we can

Xl = F

with

x1

and

x2

u2 [X2

-

E, x2 +

Ul [Xl

-

E, x2 +

E]
E]

=

-F

1

two equ atio ns.
as the two unkn own s dete rmin ed by the

Then , the shad ow pric e of labo ur is:

7

And F3 is also the mark et wage rate .
cann ot be
(ii) Trad e Tar iffs : Whi le ther efor e w*q
tari ff) can be. For,
neg ativ e, w*t (the shad ow wage for a
, x and E bein g
in this case , ,we have thre e unkn own s x1
2

dete rmin ed by:

Xl = F
u2 [Xl - E, X2 + E]
Ul [x 1 - E, X2 + E]
-F

1

::

(1 + t)

=

(1 + t)
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where tis the tariff rate.T hen:

Since F

> 0,

3

w*t

w

*t

=___!_ dU = F + t dE
3
ul dL
dE

may be negat ive when dE

< 0, · i.e.

(as evide nt

dL
from the diagr amma tic analy sis in Secti on III) when the
quant ity
of impo rts rises with the diver sion of L to seeki ng
activ ity.
B.Pro ducti on Quota and Produ ction Tax-Cu m-Sub sidy:
Next, consi der Figur e 2 for the case of produ ction
disto rtion s.

Assum e that the initi al equil ibriu m produ ction

is disto rted to Pps

but consu mptio n takes place a~ inter - ·

natio nal price s at Cps
(1)

x2 =x2 ,

Quota:

Now, if the distor tion is a quant itative one, i.e.

the DUP activi ty genera ted to get the lucrat ive premia on produ
ction

·licen ses (for produc ing good 2) will neces sarily immis erize
the economy, i.e.
*q
w
will be positi ve. The reason is clearl y that the loss of resour
ces to
the DUP activi ty will only shift the social budget line inward
s and, given x ,
2
this must reduce x
1 and hence social utilit y. In Figure 2, the shift of
produ ction is shown, under the quota, to
(ii)

Tax-Cu m-Sub sidy:

P

from the initia l P
ps
However, if the distor tion is of a price variet y,
q

i.e. a produ ction tax-cu m-sub sidy brings produ ction initia lly
to P , the corps
respon ding shadow price, w*P, can well be negati ve. This, in
fact, will

happen if the produ ction point shifts under the DUP activi ty
to within the
stripe d area, of course .
Algeb raical ly, this is seen readil y as follow s, for the quota
and
subsid y cases in turn.
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(i)

Production Quota:
~

c

In this case, we can write:

cx2 ,

F

Uz[Xl - E,

K, L)

x2 + El

=

Ul[~ - E, x2 + E]
with

x1

and

1

E as the two unknowns determined by the two equations.

Then,

we can solve readily for the shadow price of labour as:
*q

w

.. -

=

(ii)

1 [U

u1

dXl

1

dX
1
---=

dL

dE

dE ]
dL

( - - --) + u
dL

F3

Production Subsidy:
~ • F(X2, K,

=

2

dT.

Market Wage Rate

>

o.

In this case, one can write:

L)

u2 [Xl - E, Xz + E]

=1

ul [Xl - E, x2 + E]

- Fl

=

(1 + S)

with x , x and E as the three unknowns determined by the three equations and
1
2
as the production subsidy rate.

s

The shadow price of labor now is:
dX
dX

w*s = _.!. [U ( _ 1 _ dE) + U
Ul
1 dL
dt
2

(---4- + d:)]
dL

dL

= -

dX
2
Thus, if - - , is positive, i.e. if the production o.f the subsidized good increases
dL

as the aggregate endowment of labor increases,

*s

w

may be negative.

I.e.

we must admit the possibility that there may be beneficial DUP activity.
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C.

Factor Employment Quota and Factor Tax-Cum-Subsidy:
Here again, a factor employment

quantity constraint will eliminate

the possiblity of a. negative shadow factor price whereas a factor tax-cum
Confining ourselves to algebraic analysis, since

subsidy distortion will not.

the geometry is too cumbersome to be illuminating, we show this below.
(i)

Let us denote by k

Factor Employment Quota:

ratio in the production of good i (i = 1,2).

Let

1

the capital-labour

E1 be the employment

quota in the production of good 1 implemented througb an optimum wage
i

Let f (ki) be the average product of

subsidy to that industry.
labour in industry i.

Then, given that producer and consumer prices

equal world prices and that marginal value product of capital is the
same in the two sectors, we have under full employment of labour and
capital (with k , k , E as unknowns):
2
1

u2 [L- 1 f l -E, (L- - -L1)f 2 + E]
Ul[Llf1 -E, (L -

Ll

f

2

.. 1

+ E]

•C:

1

We can then solve for the sh~dow wage of labour to get:
dk

---1 - dE
di:
11 di:

{L f

I

}
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This result is easily explained .
fixed at

11 ,

With employment in industry 1

any change in aggregate endowment of labour is ac

commodated by an equivalen t change in the employment in industry 2.
Hence the shadow price of labour is the marginal value product of
labor in industry 2, i.e. the shadow wage equals the market wage
and must therefore be non-nega tive.
Factor-us e Subsidy:

(ii)

Now we have L1 , k , k 2 and E as the
1

unknowns and the following equations :

2
1 - E, (L-L
)f + E]
1
= 1
2
1
Ul[Llf ~E, (L-Ll) f + E]

u2 [L 1 f

= 1

We can then solve for the shadow wage of labour to get:

w

*s

1

= -[U

ul

1

dLl

-

dL

f

1

2 dk2
2
dLl 2
dE
1 dtl
- - ) + U2 ((1 - -;:-) f + (L-L1 )f +(L-L 1 )f1 -;:- +
11 dL
dL
dL
dL

+ L f

d
...!_]

JL
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dLl

If - -

>

0 i.e. if employment in the subsidized industry increases

dL

as the aggregate endowment

L increases, then w*s could be negative.

Once

again, therefore, DUP activity can be beneficial.

D.

Consumption Quota and Consumption Tax-cum-Subsidy :
Finally, we consider the consumption quota and tax-cum-subsidy cases

and demonstrate that, in both cases, the paradox negative shadow prices will
not arise, despite the second-best nature of the problem at hand.

(i)
be at

Consumption Constraint:
and Ucs

in Figure 3.

Let the initial situation
Interpreting this as a

consumption guantity constraint, such that C~ c , we ca~ see
2
that seeking ~ill necessarily shift the social budget line

* cs to CC ) and hence im.~iserize
to the left (i.e. from PC
q p
the economy (shifting it from Ucs to Uq >'.
(ii)

Consumption Tax-Cum-Subs idv:: In this instan.:e,

however, even if the initial situation is treated as a
consu~ption tax-cum-subs idy distortion, there will be a shift
in welfare from Ucs
Cp

to Up

as consumption shifts from Ccs to

down the in~ome-consu mption curve at constant (consu.'!ler)

goods price-ratio 'd'.

Thus, in the case of a consumption

distortion, a negative shadow factor price for a factor
cannot arise even for a price distortion!
The reason why in both the price and quantity cases,
we now have necessarily positive shadcw factor prices is easily
understood.

Since the initial situation represents full

18
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producti on efficien cy (at P* ),any seeking must necessa rily
shift the social budg2t line inwards.

For the fixed price

distorti on in consump tion, by ,~ri ting the indirect utili tv
,
function in terms of the domestic goods price ratio (p) and
the world-p rice-val ued social inccme (y), we see immedia tely
that the former (p) is fixed and the latter (y) declines
with seeking.

Hence a decline in social utility is inevitab le.

For the quantity cist~rti cn, again the decline in social income

c2

(y) implies that, given

, the attainab le c

must fall, and
1
hence again a decline in social utility follows.
Algebrai cally, these results are readily derived as follows, taking
the Quota and subsidy cases, in turn.
(i)

Consumption Quota:

In this case, we have:

-F • 1
1
and two unknowns, x and E, to be determine d.
1
wage then is:

*4 .. _!_ [U / ~ _ dE)]

w

u1

=
(ii)

F

1

~ • F(X2'

+ c2 ..

Here, we have:

K, L) _
~

U2(Cl, C2)
___,;:;.._-=- -- •

Ul(Cl, C2)

-

dL

> 0

3

Consumpti on Subsidy:

cl

_

dL

+ x2
1 - s

The solution for the shadow

20

and four unknowns,

x1 , x2 , c1

and

c2 ,

The shadow wage now is:

to be determined.

dC

dC.,_

2
+u2 -1--·•-+
di::
dL

. dc

2

(1-s)

dt

But

of both goods.

E.

Therefore:

General Principles
In all these cases, the quantity distortion does not permit the shadow

price of a factor to be negative.

Why?

The answer is clear as soon as one

understands that the marginal variation in factor supply, to determine the shadow
price of that factor, is in each such quantity-constrained case undertaken from
what can be regarded as a second-best optimal position; and, as Bhagwati's (1968)
generalization of the theory of immiserizing growth shows, immiserizing growth
(and hence its mirror image phenomenon of a negative shadow factor price, see
Bhagwati, Srinivasan and Wan (1978)) can arise only if sub-optimality is present.
The reason why the quantity-constrained cases can be regarded as involving marginal
variation of factor supply from an optimal position is that, as we know from the
theory of optimal policy intervention in the case of non-economic objectives
(Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1969), the optimal way to achieve quantity constraints or
objectives relating to production, consumption, trade and factor employment
is to utilise implicit or explicit tax-cum-subsidies on production, consumption,
trade and factor use respectively.

In fact, utilizing this very insight, Bhagwati

(1970, pp. 82-84) had argued that the phenomenon of immiserizing growth could not
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arise when non-economic objectives were being pursued with the aid of first-best

policies, but that it would resurrect itself if second-best or third-best
policies were adopted to implement them in the first place.

Proposition (1)

~hove there:ore follows immediately.
At the same time, it is equally clear that if the initial situation
is regarded as one of price distortion, it cannot now be interpreted as one
characterized by second-best optimality.

Therefore, the possibility of a negative

shadow price of a factor cannot be ruled out (except for the case of a consump
tion distortion since productive efficiency obtains in this case even under
the distortion in consumption).
V.

Hence Proposition (2) follows.

Concluding Observations:
In conclusion, two further asymmetries between QR-triggered and price

distortion-triggered DU? activities may be noted and their implications analyzed.
A. Rank-Ordering DUP Activities Triggered by QRs and Price Distortions:
While DUP activities, triggered by pure and only quantity distortions,
will necessarily be "socially wasteful", whereas this cannot be maintained in
general for price distortions, it does not follow that one can uniquely rank order
these distortions in the presence of DUP activity.

This may be illustrated by

comparing a tariff with a quota.
Thus, take Figure 1 again and consider two possibilities.

First, let the

equilibrium at Pt, without the DUP activity, be a tariff equilibrium and let it
trigger a revenue-seeking DUP activity which is, for simplicity, fully competitive
and results in all revenues being sought.

Next, consider Pt to be a quota equili

brium and again allow it to trigger a premiuM-seeking DUP activity which is fully
competitive and results in all premia on the import licenses being sought.
now the two outcomes.

Compare

One just cannot rank order the two outcomes, even if the

technology of the revenue-seeking and premium-seeking DUP activities is assumed
to be identical.
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The answer depends, in the model tmderlying Figure 1, on whether the
implicit tariff under premium-seeking falls or rises.

In the former case, the

tariff-cum-DUP -activity equilibrium will be superior to the quota-cum-DUP
activity equilibrium whereas in the latter case, this ranking will be reversed.
Figure 4 illustrates the case where the equilibrium with a tariff (price)
distortion leads to higher welfare

UTD

than the welfare

UQD tmder a quota,

with full revenue and premia being sought in the respective cases.

We start

from an initial equilibrium production at

CTQ

PTQ

and consumption at

and

then, with the tariff (imports) being maintained at the same level as at
(CTQ' PTQ)' revenue-(premiu m-) seeking activities are introduced leading to
full revenue-seeking equilibrium at
at

(CQD' PQD).

One can join

PTQ

(CTD' PTD) (and premium-seeking equilibrium
and PTD

by a generalized Rybozynski line

since producer prices at these points are the same.
producer price ratio at

PQD

However, with a quota,

is in general different from that at

the initial point for the corresponding Rybzynski

line is not

where the producer price-ratio is the same as at PQD"

PTQ

PTQ:
but

thus,
PQD

The reader can readily

redraw Figure 4 to show the reverse outcome, i.e. that the tariff-cum-DUP
activity welfare is lower than the quota-cum.-DUP -activity welfare

(UTD < UQ0 )

by depicting a situation where the implicit tariff falls with DUP activity.
This would of course imply that Figure 4 would have to be redrawn such that
PQD is to the right of

on AB.

Algebraically, this is seen as follows.

At the full seeking equilibrium,

consumer expenditure equals factor incomes that correspond to the production
point on the production possibility curve at which the marginal rate of trans
formation equals the domestic price ratio.

Hence, denoting by p this domestic
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price ratio and by

Y(p) the total factor income given
V(p, Y(p)).

terms of the direct utility function

equals the marginal rate of transformation, we get
Hence

dV.
dp

av+ av. x
op

3Y

•

2

oY

P

From the fact that
:;

~ x2

Now from Roy's identity we know

is the consumption .of good 2.

av> o and

p, we can write welfare in

=output
av
ay

C2 • -

of good 2.

av
ap
where

Thus

good 2 is the importable.

Hence if the domestic price ratio

corresponding to the equilibrium with a quota and full rent seeking is ~reater
(smaller) than the tariff inclusive price, welfare in that equilibrium will
be lower (higher) than that under a tariff with full revenue seeking.

In

other words, the comparison of welfare levels reduces to a comparison of the
implicit tariff under the quota (and full rent seeking) with the explicit
tariff.

B.

Shadow Factor Prices in Presence of DUP Activities:
Finally, it is evident that the shadow prices of factors at the

DUP-activity-inclusive equilibrium,

8

even if perchance such equilibrium is

identical for a price and a quantity distortion (a most unlikely occurence,
of course, in view of our analysis in Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980) and here),
will be different.

It was shown in Section IV that the shadow factor price

of each factor at the initial equilibrium with DUP activities absent is its
market price as long as the distortion is a quantity distortion.

But, follow-

ing on an interesting contribution of Foster (1981), we can see that this rather
remarkable result holds for the tariff-cum-revenue-seeking equilibrium:

namely,

that in this instance, short of specialization, the shadow prices are the market
prices.

Thus, consider the equilibrium (PTD' CTD) in Figure 4.

Now, with the

entire revenue sought away, the consumer expenditure on goods equals income at
market prices for factors.

And these factor prices and goods prices do not change
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as we vary factor endowments thanks to the tariff.

As such, the value of change

in the labour {capital) endowment by a unit is its market reward:
shadow factor prices are the market prices.

hence the

Asymmetrically, this proposition does

not extend generally to shadow prices of factors at the quota-cum-premium-seeking
equilibrium {PQD' CQD in Figure 4).

For, generally, the implicit tariff and

hence factor prices will vary with marginal variation in the factor supply.

Fl

Footnote s

1·
Pronounc ed as "dupe" activiti es, the phrase DUP activiti es also comes

close to the spirit in which economi sts are likely to view such activiti es!
The alterna tive of calling them ZOP (i.e. zero-ou tput profit-s eeking) activiti es
is, on that ground, less appealin g.

Strictly speaking , these activiti es provide

income to factors employed in them.

As such, income- seeking' rather than

'profit- seeking ' is a more appropr iate way of characte rizing them.

However,

given the aptness of the word "dupe" in describi ng them, we have chosen to
retain the phrase "profit- seeking ''.
2There
would nonethe less appear to persist a differen ce since, in
princip le, Buchana n's definiti on could include positive -output , traditio nal
activiti es that, just because some distorti on was present in the economy,
created a social loss.

That also seems to be an objectio nable feature of the

Buchanan definiti on, if indeed the definiti on permits this interpre tation as
it seems to.
3
we did notice that, in the presence of quotas, welfare

could not

be inferred from shifts in the budget constra int, i.e., the Little-M irrlees
logic had to be modifie d.

So, we cast the algebra in egs._ (9) and (10) on

shadow prices into the utility-i mpact format but, in discussi ng the sign of
eq. (11) on the utility impact of premium -seeking , we admitted the possibi lity
that the sign could be positive , i.e. welfare might improve thanks to premium 
seeking , whereas our present analysis shows that, in the model we used, this
i s ~ possibl e.

F2

4
These proposition s are based upon there being just one distortion
in the economy and need not hold when there are more than one distortion.
For instance, if there are several foreign distortions , proposition 1 need
not hold unless each distortion happens to be a quota.

Alasdair Smith

drew our attention to these possibiliti es.
5

These four cases have been distinguishe d and analyzed, from the

viewpoint of the theory of policy intervention in the presence of non-economi c
objectives, in Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969).
·6

The full rationale for all cases is developed in subsection E below.

7
The interm.ediat e. steps in deriving w*q • F are:
3

--

• F dX + F • F dX •
2
1
3
2
1
8

-

dL

I.e. in Figure 4 at

dL

PTD, CTD and

PQD' CQD

for revenue

seeking and premium-see king DUP activities respectivel y.
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